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Efficiency of the Mutual Fund Industry: an Examination of U.S. Domestic
Equity Funds: 1995-2004
Abstract

Investors have the ability to choose between two different management styles in the mutual fund industry.
These two management styles differ in both the investment strategy type the fund executes and management
costs, which are charged to the funds’ investors. First, investors may invest their funds in index funds, which
employ a passive investment strategy. Here, investors expect to earn a rate of return equivalent to the market
index—minus a small management fee—which the fund seeks to track. Alternatively, investors may choose
active fund management. The returns of these mutual funds rely on stock selection ability of portfolio
managers. Active portfolio managers perform securities research and obtain information in an attempt to
distinguish between undervalued and overvalued securities—allowing them to outperform the market. To
compensate for the cost of this research, these funds generally charge a higher management fee which is paid
by individual mutual fund investors. In 2004, the average actively managed fund expense ratio was
approximately 140 basis points, while the majority of index funds charge fees ranging from 10 basis points to
50 basis points. A expense ratio of 140 basis points would mean that $140 of every $10,000 invested by an
individual in a fund will go to the portfolio manager in order to compensate them for their research and
management. Some funds carry further expenses in the form of load charges. They take a percentage of an
investors initial investment as a sales commission, as these funds are distributed directly by the fund
management company. Much debate within the investment community has revolved around the question of
whether the fees charged by actively managed mutual funds are justified with higher returns. [excerpt]
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Efficiency of the Mutual Fund Industry:
an Examination of U.S. Domestic
Equity Funds: 1995-2004
By Chase Stewart

I. INTRODUCTION
Investors have the ability to choose between two different management styles
in the mutual fund industry. These two management styles differ in both the
investment strategy type the fund executes and management costs, which are
charged to the funds’ investors. First, investors may invest their funds in index
funds, which employ a passive investment strategy. Here, investors expect to
earn a rate of return equivalent to the market index—minus a small management
fee—which the fund seeks to track. Alternatively, investors may choose active
fund management. The returns of these mutual funds rely on stock selection
ability of portfolio managers. Active portfolio managers perform securities
research and obtain information in an attempt to distinguish between undervalued and overvalued securities—allowing them to outperform the market. To
compensate for the cost of this research, these funds generally charge a higher
management fee which is paid by individual mutual fund investors. In 2004, the
average actively managed fund expense ratio was approximately 140 basis points,
while the majority of index funds charge fees ranging from 10 basis points to 50
basis points. A expense ratio of 140 basis points would mean that $140 of every
$10,000 invested by an individual in a fund will go to the portfolio manager in
order to compensate them for their research and management. Some funds
carry further expenses in the form of load charges. They take a percentage of an
investors initial investment as a sales commission, as these funds are distributed
directly by the fund management company. Much debate within the investment
community has revolved around the question of whether the fees charged by
actively managed mutual funds are justified with higher returns.
In a model where information is costly to obtain and use during the stock
selection and market timing process, it is efficient for trades made by informed
investors to compensate them for their research [Grossman and Stiglitz,1980].
Thus, it should be found that active mutual fund managers will provide investors
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with returns higher than that of their index fund counterparts—offsetting the
higher fees paid for their management. And, in equilibrium, management fees
will be exactly equal to the cost born by management to obtain trading information. This type of model can be contrasted with a situation in which stock
information is free. In this situation, Fama [1970] states that security prices will
incorporate all available information. Under this form of the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis (EMH), investors would be irrational to invest in active funds, as efficiency in the market would make it impossible for them to outperform passive
index funds. In effect, investors would be paying portfolio managers to gather
information already imbedded in the market.
It will be the main focus of this paper to test for market efficiency in the
mutual fund industry under the conditions of costly information. The paper will
first begin with an overview of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the
Sharpe Ratio and review relevant studies on mutual fund performance. Next, the
CAPM and the Sharpe Ratio will be estimated for the funds in our sample and
compared to the overall market. From this analysis, it will be evaluated whether
active equity funds on average have had the ability to “beat the market” over the
period 1995-2004. This will be followed by a further analysis of industry cost
efficiency—updating previous studies by testing the effect of management fees
and load charges on fund returns with the most recently available data. This
analysis will be used to test for inefficiencies in our chosen model of market
efficiency. Last, the findings of this research will be summarized, and concluding
statements regarding its implications for rational investors will be made.
II. Portfolio Theory and Literature Review
The beginnings of modern portfolio theory came about in the early 1960s.
The following section will review two models of portfolio returns that have been
developed since that time. In addition, relevant studies on portfolio returns will
be examined.
A. The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Sharpe Ratio
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed by Sharpe [1964]
and others over the course of the 1960s. This model explains portfolio and
security returns with the following equation:
E ( Ri ) = RFR + b ( RM − RFR)
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Here, a portfolio’s or security’s expected return is equal to the return of the risk
free rate (RFR) and its correlation with the return of the market (RM)—defined
by its Beta. The CAPM assumes that no other factors affect a portfolio’s expected
return—thus the CAPM expects no abnormal return. Typically, the CAPM in
used in empirical research in the following form developed by Jensen [1968]:
Rt − RFRt = a + b ( RMt − RFRt )

The constant term is often referred to as “Jensen’s Alpha.” Alpha is the measure
of abnormal return in this form of the CAPM equation (again, expected to be
zero). Jensen [1968] found, using data on all mutual funds from 1945-1964,
that the mean alpha of funds was negative—leading him to conclude that the
majority of mutual funds could not on average “beat the market.” However, Ippolito [1989] found contradicting evidence, as the mean alpha for funds in his
study was positive—leading him to conclude that it was possible for a random
selection of funds to outperform the market. In addition, Ippolito [1989] used
regression analysis to further support his findings, finding that expenses did not
have a statistically significant relationship with fund returns. Using the same
time period and methodology, Elton et al. [1993] found contradictory findings
to that of Ippolito when adding a proxy variable for non-S&P500 stocks into
the model.
The first section of this paper will update these previous studies with data
on all domestic mutual funds (ex-specialty funds) over the ten year period
1995-2004. Both the CAPM equation and the Sharpe Ratio of risk-adjusted
returns will be used to test whether active funds have the ability to outperform
the market. While very similar, Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe Ratio differ in
their definition of risk. The CAPM equation defines risk as volatility from the
market portfolio—systematic risk. On the other hand, the Sharpe Ratio uses a
portfolio’s standard deviation as its proxy for risk, which measures total risk.
The Sharpe Ratio is defined by the equation:
SR =

R t − RFR t
st

The numerator is the average portfolio return in period t minus the average riskfree rate of return over period t. The denominator of the equation is the standard
deviation of those returns—resulting in a composite measure of portfolio performance indicating the risk premium earned per unit of total risk. By comparing
the Sharpe Ratio of a fund to that of the market portfolio, one can gauge the
superiority or inferiority of that fund’s returns [Reilly and Brown, 2003].
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B. The Role of Costs in Mutual Fund Performance
Previous studies have found contradictory evidence in regards to the role
of management fees on fund performance. Early studies by Friend et al. [1970],
Jensen [1968], and Sharpe [1966] all found that mutual funds do not earn rates of
return high enough to offset their expenses. More recently, Bogle [1998] found
similar results by testing over a ten year period ending in 2001 and a five year
period ending in 1997. In our model of efficiency, these results would lead us
to assume that the mutual fund industry is not in equilibrium. Other studies,
however, have found that funds do achieve returns that are sufficient enough
to offset their costs. As discussed above, the most notable of these studies was
done by Ippolito [1989]. Like the work of Ippolito, the main focus of this paper
will be to update previous studies and test for market efficiency in the mutual
fund industry using CAPM methodology. In addition, the Sharpe Ratio will
be used to further examine the nature of returns and costs in the mutual fund
industry.
III. Analysis of Risk-Adjusted Returns
A. Sample Selection
The sample used throughout this paper includes all U.S. domestic equity
funds (ex-specialty funds). All historical data was obtained from the Morningstar, Inc. Premium Mutual Fund Screener, which holds up to ten years of
historical data for currently existing funds. As with Jensen [1968], this sample
suffers from survivorship bias, as only funds still existing currently are available
to be selected in the sample. To meet the sample selection criteria, a fund had
to have ten years of available historical data. In addition, all index funds and
institutional funds were removed from the sample. Using the selection criteria,
962 funds were included in the sample. Information on returns, expense ratios,
and load fees were all obtained from the Morningstar, Inc. Premium Mutual
Fund Screener database. Other variables used in this section and those that
follow are derived or calculated from this data.
B. Jensen’s Alpha, 1995-2004
For each fund in the sample set, Jensen’s form of the CAPM equation was
estimated:
(1) Rt − RFRt = a + b ( RMt − RFRt ) + e t , t = 1995-2004,
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where Rt is the rate of return for the fund in year t. This return is net of all
management fees except load charges. The variable RFRt is the risk-free rate of
return in year t, as measured by the return of U.S. Treasury Bills [Damodaran,
2005]. The rate of return in year t of the market portfolio, defined here as the
S&P 500, is denoted RMt [Damodaran, 2005]. Remember that the CAPM has an
E[α] = 0; however, superior portfolio managers who have market timing ability
or can consistently select undervalued securities will earn higher risk premiums
than the CAPM predicts. In terms of the regression, superior portfolio managers will
have consistently positive random error terms—resulting in a positive constant
term, or alpha. Consistent inferior performance in turn would lead to a negative
alpha [Reilly and Brown, 2003].
Based on the 95 percent level of confidence, it was found that of the 962
mutual funds analyzed, 905 were characterized by alphas statistically indistinguishable from zero, 12 by statistically significant positive alphas, and 45 by
statistically significant negative alphas. These results are summarized in TABLE
I with the findings of Jensen [1968] and Ippolito [1989]. The mean alpha for the
sample was -0.17 percent, indicating that the funds in the sample, on average,
had inferior performance compared to the overall market. These results were
similar to those found by Jensen [1968].
TABLE I
Alphas for U.S. Domestic Equity Funds
		
Zeroa Positive Negative Total
						

Mean
Alpha

Mean
Beta

Current Study, 1995-2004

905

12

45

962

-0.17

0.83

Ippolito, 1965-1984

127

12

4

143

0.81

0.88

Jensen, 1945-1964

98

3

14

115

-1.1

0.84

b

						

a. Alphas are classified as zero if the absolute t-values of the estimated alpha coefficients are less than 2.306, which entails the 95%
confidence interval, two-tail test
b. Fifty-six funds in the Jensen study were based on annual data from 1945-1964; the remaining results were based on annual data
from 1955-1964

FIGURE I

Current Study, 1995-2004
positive 1%

Ippolito, 1965-1984
positive 8%

negative 5%

negative
12%

negative 3%

zero
94%

Jensen, 1945-1964
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zero
89%

positive
3%

zero
85%

C. Sharpe Ratio, 1995-2004
Similar to the section above, a Sharpe Ratio was calculated for each of the
962 funds in the sample. The Geometric Sharpe Ratio, denoted in the following
equation, was used:

R t − RFR t , t = ten year period ending Dec. 31, 2004,
(2) 			
SR =
st
is the compound annual growth rate (CAGR), or geometric rate of
where t < 1985
return, for each mutual fund from 1995-2004; and RFR t is the CAGR for U.S.
treasury bills over the same period. The variable σt is the geometric standard
deviation of fund returns over the ten year period. The results on this analysis
are found in Table II.
The Sharpe Ratio for the market (S&P 500 index), is approximately 0.21.
Under portfolio theory, this figure represents the risk-adjusted return falling on
the Capital Market Line [Reilly and Brown, 2003]. Thus, a fund with a higher
Sharpe Ratio would have earned a risk-adjusted return in excess of the market.
For the 962 funds, only 384 were able to earn returns above the Capital
Market Line. This represents approximately 40 percent of the mutual funds in
the sample. The mean Sharpe Ratio was 0.17654, approximately 0.035 below
the return obtained by the S&P 500 market index. This result is similar to that
found using Jensen’s alpha—revealing that the funds in the sample failed to “beat
the market” on risk-adjusted terms.
TABLE II
Sharpe Ratio for U.S. Domestic Equity Funds
		
		
		

Sharpe
Ratio of
S&P 500

Current Study, 1995-2004

0.2109878

Funds
Funds 		
Outperforming Underperforming
Total
384

578

962

Mean 		
Sharpe Ratio
0.17654

IV. Cost Efficiency of U.S. Domestic Equity Mutual Funds
A. Model of Mutual Fund Cost Efficiency
In the model of efficiency tested in this paper, costs play the central role.
Under forms of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) where security prices
reflect all available information, there is no possible way for informed (active)
portfolio managers to outperform the market. Thus, investors placing their
savings in actively managed mutual funds are playing a loser’s game, as they are
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paying fees to reimburse mutual fund managers for collecting and trading on
information that is already reflected in market prices. Ippolito [1989] asserts
that this type of market equilibrium is flawed. If information is costly to obtain
and implement, then equilibrium, in which securities reflect all information,
makes it impossible for the market to compensate for information-gathering
activities. Thus, if the mutual fund industry is occupied by rational investors,
active funds would eventually cease to exist as investors would recognize this
impossibility.
Instead of assuming that the existence of active funds is irrational, we assume a
different model of efficiency in the mutual fund industry which is used by Ippolito
[1989]. In this model, Ippolito [1989] supposes that there are a certain number
of informed traders that are able to generate a wedge between trade prices and
full-information prices by gathering information. In equilibrium, passive investors essentially pay informed traders a sufficient amount to compensate for the
market arbitrage function [Grossman, 1976]. Thus, informed traders “beat the
market” before expenses, but make no excess returns after netting out the costs
borne during the information-gathering activity (if this were not the case and
informed traders “beat the market” after netting out expenses, it would pay for
more investors to become informed). So, in equilibrium, there is no incentive to
favor an actively managed fund or a passively managed index fund.
To test this model of efficiency, OLS methodology will be used to examine
whether expense ratios and load fees have any impact on the risk-adjusted rate
of return earned by all funds in the sample.
B. Specification
As with our earlier analysis, both Jensen’s CAPM equation and the Geometric
Sharpe Ratio will be used. For the CAPM, the following OLS equations will be used:
(3) Rt − RFRt = bb i ( RMt − RFRt ) + cEi + dLi + eMFi + fYt + e t , t = 1995-2004
where βi is the fund beta estimated from equation one. Thus, coefficient of this
variable should be statistically insignificant from one. The variable Ei denotes
the fund’s expense ratio as of Dec 31, 2004; and Li is a dummy variable indicating
whether a mutual fund charges a load fee.
It should be noted that this regression uses panel data derived from our
original sample. Thus, each fund has ten observations, one for each year of
the sample period. The variables MFi and Yt are vectors of mutual fund and
year dummies. These vectors are used to account for correlations between the
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residual across funds and years [Ippolito, 1989]. Due to constraints of our estimation capabilities of our available statistical software, the sample size had to be
reduced. A random sampling of 750 funds was selected from the original 962.
It is assumed that this sampling has little to no effect on the empirical results of
the regression analysis.
Similar regressions are run using the Geometric Sharpe Ratio. The return
measure used in the equation is the ratio of the fund minus that of the S&P 500
index:
(4) SRt − SRS & P 500,t = a + bEi + cLi + e t , t = 1995-2004
The entire sample of 962 funds was used for this regression. The results of both
regressions are shown in TABLE III and TABLE IV.
D. Empirical Results of Cost Efficiency
The results from the OLS regressions indicate that mutual funds are not
cost efficient as the theoretical model suggests. For cost efficiency to hold, one
would expect the coefficients on the expense ratio variable in the regressions
to be insignificant from zero; however, this only held true using equation 5. In
all other instances, there was a strong negative relationship between a fund’s
expense ratio and its return. The estimated coefficients on the expense variable
suggest that for each unit increase in Ei, the fund’s return decreased anywhere
from 0.86 to 2.5 percent from its expected value in the CAPM.
TABLE III
Effect of Expenses and Load fees on Performance [Rt-RFRt], 1995-2004
Variable

Mean
βt[RMt-RFRt]
8.159
		
Expense Ratio
1.420
		
Loada
0.405
		
Mutual fund and year dummy variablesb
X
2
R 		
Observations		
a. Load is a dummy variable equal to one for funds with load charges
b. Includes a dummy variable for each mutual fund and one for each year
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(3)
1.00		
(41.03)		
-1.65		
(-4.08)		
10.33		
(2.40)		
X		
0.73		
7500

It is unclear whether those funds charging loads earn returns sufficient to
offset the additional fee charged to investors. By law, a mutual fund may charge
up to an 8.50 percent load charge [Ippolito, 1989]. The results obtained by
equation 3 indicate that such a fee would be offset typically within one to five
years of the purchase of the fund. On the other hand, the results obtained by
equation 4 indicate that funds charging a load fee do not earn returns higher or
lower than no-load funds.
TABLE IV
Effect of Expenses and Load fees on Performance
[Sharpefund-SharpeS&P500], 1995-2004
Variable
Mean
Expense Ratio
1.431
		
Loada
0.395
		
Constant
X
		
R2		
Observations		

(4)
-0.15		
(16.35)		
-0.018		
(0.49)		
0.19		
(1.25)		
0.22		
962

a. Load is a dummy variable equal to one for funds with load charges

V. Conclusion
This paper examined cost efficiency in mutual fund industry using a model
in which it is costly for portfolio managers obtain information about securities.
The data and methodology are similar to that of several papers ranging in time
from the 1960s to the 1990s, most notably that of Ippolito [1989] and Jensen
[1968]. The CAPM and Sharpe Ratio were used to analyze the risk-adjusted
returns of 962 U.S. domestic equity mutual funds over the period 1995-2004.
It was found that actively managed funds failed to meet their objective
and outperform the market, defined by this study as the S&P 500 index, on a
risk-adjusted basis. The overall mean alpha for the mutual fund industry was
-0.17, with 45 funds characterized by statistically significant negative alphas,
and only 12 funds with statistically significant positive alphas. In addition,
only 40 percent of funds in the sample were found to outperform the Capital
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Market Line over the ten year period when using the Sharpe Ratio as a proxy
of risk-adjusted returns. The results found using the CAPM were similar to
that of Jensen [1968], but contradictory to those found by Ippolito [1968]. The
presence of such contradictory results should lead to future research to find
why the industry alpha in the mutual fund industry changes over time or differs
depending on the sample period.
Following the methodology of Ippolito [1989], OLS regression analysis was
also used to assess cost efficiency in the mutual fund industry. In the equilibrium
of the model tested, portfolio managers were assumed to be able to outperform
the market by an amount exactly equal to the cost required to obtain and use the
information which they used to trade—thus, investors earn the same return in
index funds and active funds. Results, using OLS methodology, did not support
evidence that the mutual fund industry was in equilibrium during the sample
period, or even perhaps that such a model governs the mutual fund industry. It
was found that funds with higher expense ratios, on average, earned lower rates
of return after expenses. Thus, these funds did not earn rates of return that were
sufficient to offset the higher management fees they charge investors. From the
analysis presented in this paper, it is unclear whether funds charging load fees
did earn rates of return that were sufficient to offset their sales charges. The
regression based off of the CAPM showed that a load charge would be offset
by higher returns within a one to five year period on average. However, the
regression using the Sharpe Ratio indicated that load funds earn returns that
are insignificantly different from no-load funds.
These results suggest that rational investors should take expense ratios into
account when making mutual fund investment decisions, and might consider
cheap passive portfolio management as a superior option to that of active fund
management. Although, it should be reiterated that the results presented in this
paper are in alignment with some past studies, while contradictory to others.
This suggests that studies on mutual fund efficiency may be dependent on both
the methodology and, more importantly, the time periods used in the study.
Future research using multiple long-term time periods might shed more light
on the effects of costs on mutual fund returns.
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Appendix A: DATA DEFINITIONS
Listed below are the data definitions of all fund variables obtained from the
Morningstar Premium Fund Screener database:
Expense Ratio
The expense ratio of a mutual fund expresses the percentage of assets deducted each fiscal year for fund expenses. These expenses include 12b-1 fees,
management fees, administrative fees, operating costs, and all other asset-based
cost incurred by the fund. The expense ratios used in this analysis are those
reported as of December 31st of 2004 by each fund. It should be noted that
these expense ratios for trailing returns-as year by year expense ratio data was
not available. Therefore, it is an implicit assumption of this analysis that the
expenses of these equity funds have either all stayed the same for the past five
years or have all changed up or down by the same proportion over the various
time periods.
Fund Returns
Annual total returns are calculated on a calendar-year basis. This return
includes both income, given in the forms of dividends, and capital gains or losses.
Morningstar, Inc. calculates total return by taking the change in the fund’s NAV,
assuming reinvestment of all income and capital gains distributions during the
period, and then dividing by the initial NAV. These returns are adjusted for
expenses included in a funds expense ratio.
No-Load Funds
No load funds are sold to do-it-yourself investors and thus carry no sales charge.
Because of the variety and complexity of possible sales charges and marketing
fees, it is difficult to create hard and fast rules that separate load and no-load
funds. Morningstar currently defines no-load funds as those offerings that
have no front-end or deferred load, and a 12b-1 fee less than or equal to 0.25%
per year.
Other Data Issues-Survivorship Bias
Like many other studies dealing with mutual funds, this analysis must deal
with fund survivorship. For this study, only funds which still exist today will be
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included-as data for funds that have closed were not available. This issue also
creates another issue for analyzing past returns of funds. Since poor performers tend to drop out while strong performers continue to operate, this cause an
overestimation of past returns. This is known as survivorship bias. Assuming
that more active funds drop out over time (as poor performance is usually defined
by trailing a benchmark/index), it may be appropriate to keep in mind that the
overall average returns for active funds is overstated in this study. For example,
the Wall Street Journal reported in 1997 that during the time period 1982-1992
mutual funds reported average returns of 18.1%. When survivorship bias was
taken into account, average fund returns were taken down to 16.3%.
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